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1.   INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s countries in the West and Central African franc zones faced serious economic
difficulties evidenced by stagnating (in some cases declining) gross national product (GNP) per
capita.  Despite several macroeconomic and sectoral reforms (liberalization in particular), the
persistent overvaluation of the CFA Franc, which began in the mid-1980s, was contributing to a
deepening of the crisis.
The agricultural sector was not spared from this general trend, with continuous declines in the
value of agricultural exports and production per capita registered from the mid-1980s to the early
1990s.  Slow growth in agricultural productivity, which lagged behind population growth,
contributed to uncertainty regarding to food security and general economic development. In short,
meeting the challenge of agricultural transformation in the countries of the Franc zone was viewed
as a daunting task as the decade of the 1990s began.   It was in this context that the historic 50%
devaluation of the CFA Franc was introduced on January 14, 1994.
Impacts of the devaluation were expected to vary by sector, social group, and location.  While
there was concern about the food security of low-income groups and salaried employees in the
formal sector (particularly civil servants) being hurt by the devaluation, there was also hope that
export crop sectors and those producing food crops with strong demand in regional markets
would become more competitive, stimulating economic expansion.
For the food sector, which is the focus of this paper, growth in intra-regional commerce was
anticipated among the members of the CFA zone as well as between CFA Franc-zone countries
and other West African countries. The potential for expanding regional trade raised hopes of
advancing the agricultural transformation through market-stimulated intensification of agricultural1As we used methods applied in the World Bank Atlas, these numbers are similar to current GNP.   Cf.
World Bank, African Development Indicators 1998/99.
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production.  In fact, the thinness of the domestic markets and the poorly developed regional trade
networks had always been considered major constraints hampering agricultural transformation. 
The devaluation was expected to increase the cost of imports from outside the CFA Franc zone
and lower the costs of exporting from the Franc zone to other countries in West Africa, thereby
strengthening the potential for intra-regional trade and expanding the markets for production
originating in the CFA countries.
In this paper, we analyze the progress made in realizing this anticipated boost in economic growth
for three agricultural subsectors: cereals, livestock/meat, and horticultural products.  We begin
with a discussion of the agricultural sector in general, based on an overview of the trends in
macroeconomic indicators following the devaluation (section 2).  Section 3 examines changes in
the trading environment and the reaction of markets to these changes.  Section 4 describes the
responses of producers and traders to the new opportunities offered by the devaluation; the
analysis looks at input/output price trends, trading opportunities and their impact on production.
We conclude in section 5 by evaluating the results obtained, drawing conclusions about the
devaluation’s impact on agricultural transformation, and offering recommendations concerning
future directions.
2.   EVOLUTION OF MACROECONOMIC AND SECTORAL INDICATORS
FOLLOWING THE DEVALUATION
This section presents an analysis of macroeconomic indicators, describing the context in which the
opportunities for agricultural transformation were acted upon following changes in regional trade
patterns stimulated by the devaluation.
Table 1 compares the average annual GNP per capita before and after the devaluation (1990-93
vs. 1994-1997) for seven countries in the Franc zone.
1  One notes a striking decline in GNP/capita
for all countries but Benin between the pre-devaluation and post-devaluation periods.  Relatively
speaking, Niger experienced the greatest decline (almost 30%), followed by Burkina Faso,
Senegal, and Chad (about 20% each).  In absolute numbers, Senegal exhibited the largest decline
($135 between the two periods).3





Mali Niger Senegal Chad
Absolute change (US $) -12.5 -57.5 -95 -40 -85 -135 -55
Relative change (%) -3.38 -20.35 -12.3 -13.8 -29.8 -20.3 -19.3
Source : Authors’  calculations from data in Table A1
This simple comparison of the two periods, however,  masks the evolution taking place within
each period.  Thus, Table 2 presents the results of regression analysis used to estimate growth
rates by country for the periods 1988-1993 and 1994-1997.  Economic stagnation prevailed in
three (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Chad)  of  the seven countries from 1988-1993, as the estimated
coefficients for the time trend in the pre-devaluation period are not statistically different from
zero; in three others (Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, and Senegal) growth was negative.  Only in Mali was
growth statistically significant and positive before the devaluation.  Three of the seven countries
exhibit statistically significant and positive rates of growth for the post-devaluation period:
Burkina Faso (6%), Senegal (4%), and Benin (3%).  Growth was negative during the same period
for Niger and Chad (both about -2%).  For Cote d’Ivoire and Mali, the overall situation for the
post-devaluation period was one of stagnating GNP/capita, however there were signs of positive 
growth beginning in 1997; 4% for Cote d’Ivoire and 8% for Mali (figures shown in Table A1).





Mali Niger Senegal Chad
Before devaluation
1988/93 0.14 -1.35 -4.83** +3.24*
*
-5.20** -3.03** 1.28
1993/94 -10.53 -12.5 -10.53 -16.7 -12.5 -12.73 -8
After devaluation
1994/97 +3.47** +6.16** 0.82 0.26 -2.43** +4.32** -1.93*
Source : Authors’ calculation from Table A1
* Regression coefficient significant at 95% level. 
** Regression coefficient significant at 95% level. 
Despite a drop in the average GNP/capita between the two periods separated by the devaluation,
three countries have shown overall per capita GNP growth since the devaluation, and two others
began to show signs of positive growth in 1997; only Niger and Chad continue to experience4
negative growth trends.  Despite the positive trends, however, by 1997 none of the seven
countries had reached their pre-devaluation levels of GNP/capita.





d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal
Current Account Balance
Deficit excluding net Capital
Grants, as Share of GNP
34 39 38 -52 11 13 -23
Capital Goods Imports in








Investments in Millions of
U.S. Dollars (Current Prices)
+33
(2) -24 1 692 -3 -3 -3
Government Deficit including
Grants as Share of GNP -61 -63 -42 -78 -44 -61 -86
Gross Domestic Investment as
Share of GNP 26 18 98 95 13 46 19
Value Added in Agriculture
in Millions of U.S. Dollars,
constant 1987 Prices 
23 14 22 11 15 11 8
Agriculture Value Added as
Share of GNP  7 11 29 54 20 25 35
Food Imports as Share of
Value of Agricultural Exports NA -75
(1) -49
(1) -20
(1) -4 NA 44
Source :World Bank,  African Development Indicators 1998/99.
Notes:
(1) 1990-1993 vs 1994-1996. 
(2) 1991-1993 vs 1995-1997.
(3) Figures grew from negative to positive amounts so no percentage change can be computed.
NA means no data were available.
Table 3 reviews the evolution of selected macroeconomic indicators.  Three indicators in
particular show strong positive trends across all countries when moving from pre- to post-
devaluation measures: (1) gross domestic investment as a share of GNP, (2) value added in
agriculture, and (3) agricultural value added as a share of GNP.  Growth in domestic investment
was particularly important in Chad (98% increase between the two periods) and Cote d’Ivoire5
(95% increase).  The investment growth in Chad is probably due to investments for petroleum
exploration. 
Agricultural value added grew fastest in Benin (23%) and Chad (22%).  The consistent growth in
agricultural value added as well as the growth in the share of agricultural value added in GNP
confirms that the agricultural sector was among the sectors benefitting from the devaluation. 
  
Although budget deficits continue to be the rule, the share of GNP represented by these deficits
has declined across all countries -- most strongly for Cote d’Ivoire (-78%) and Senegal (-86%). 
The value of food imports as a share of the value of agricultural exports has declined substantially
in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Cote d’Ivoire (-75, -49, and -20%, respectively) but remained
relatively stable in Mali (-4%) and actually increased in Senegal (+44%).
Performance of other indicators such as balance of trade deficits and foreign investments is mixed
and at times disappointing, even though slight improvements occurred in some countries.  For
example, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, and Mali were able to attract significantly more foreign
investment after the devaluation, and the first two countries even improved their balance of
payments.
Growth in agricultural value added is an important indicator of general health in the agricultural
sector. The first two columns of Table 4 show the results of regression analyses used to estimate
pre- and post-devaluation growth rates for agricultural value added (using constant 1987 U.S.
dollars).  From 1990-93, growth rates for Benin, Burkina Faso, and Chad were positive and
statistically significant (6%, 9%, and 13%, respectively); in the remaining countries, coefficients
were not significant, suggesting stagnation in the growth of value added.  From 1993-1997,
growth in value added was positive and statistically significant for all countries but Niger. 
Although growth rates remained positive for Benin, Burkina Faso, and Chad following
devaluation, they did decline (Chad, the worst case, dropped from a growth rate of 13% to about
2%).
Growth in the value of agricultural exports is another good indicator of agricultural sector
performance.  Unfortunately, the number of observations was insufficient (data series ending in
1996) for estimating post-devaluation growth rates.  Regression results presented in the third
column of Table 4 show that from 1990-1993 agricultural export growth was either stagnant
(Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali) or strongly negative (Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Senegal
exhibiting rates ranging from -7% in Niger to -26% in Senegal).  Although the negative trends
were attenuated following the devaluation, not a single country exhibited consistent year-to-year
growth in agricultural exports between 1993 and 1996 (Table 5).  By 1996, however, five of the
seven countries were realizing agricultural export receipts substantially greater than those earned
in 1993 (bottom line of Table 5):  Benin had more than doubled receipts while Burkina Faso, Cote
d’Ivoire, Mali, and Chad had increases ranging from 25% to 51%. Niger is the only country
showing absolutely no growth in agricultural exports since 1993. For Senegal, despite a dramatic
increase in exports from 1993 to 1994 (38%), the trend has been negative ever since.6
Table 4.  Estimated Growth Rates for Selected Indicators of Agricultural Productivity
Agricultural Value Added 
(% growth/yr using constant 1987 prices)
Agricultural Exports 
(% growth/yr. using current US$ values) 
1990-93 1993-97
1 1990-93
Benin 5.59*   4.31**  1.37   
Burkina Faso 9.15** 5.25**  -9.97** 
Côte d’Ivoire 1.18   5.38**  -2.12    
Mali 0.81   4.85**  1.37  
Niger 2.56   0.98     -6.63**
Senegal -2.75    2.5**  -26.07** 
Chad 13.20** 1.73** -10.15** 
Source: Authors’ calculation from The World Bank African Development Indicators 1998/99
Notes:
1  Data for 1997 are preliminary
*   Regression coefficient significant at 95% level.
** Regression coefficient significant at 99% level.





d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Chad
1993/94 38.55 -13.98 -0.62 -4.76 0 38.46 40.48
1994/95 74.78 76.25 39.02 12.92 -6.25 -8.73 22.88
1995/96 -6.47 -12.77 8.3 15.87 0 -24.35 -12.41
1993/96 126.49 32.25 49.63 24.61 -6.25 -4.4 51.2
 Source: Authors’ calculation from The World Bank African Development Indicators 1998/99; export values
reported in millions of U.S. dollars, current prices.2This section draws heavily on studies by PRISAS on the evolution of the cattle subsector in five
countries (Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal) following  the CFA franc devaluation.  See
Yade et al., 1998.
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3.  CHANGES IN THE CONTEXT AND INTENSITY OF REGIONAL TRADE
Regional trade is determined by regional production and prices as well as by both the regional and
world markets.  This analysis will focus on three important commodities that are traded in the
region: livestock/meat, cereals and horticultural products.  Given that existing statistics only
partially cover regional trade, the following analysis is primarily qualitative and indicative.
3.1 Livestock/meat
2
At the time of the devaluation of the CFA franc, the livestock subsector in the Sahel (Burkina
Faso, Mali, Niger) was facing stiff competition from international meat exports, primarily heavily
subsidized meat from the European Union, in its traditional export markets on the coast (Benin,
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo).  This led coastal countries to gradually substitute
imported European beef for Sahelian imports.  Consequently, the main hoped-for effect of the
1994 devaluation for this subsector was the restoration of the competitiveness of Sahelian exports
in the coastal markets. 
The livestock subsector in the region is characterized by relatively weak state direct involvement
and, as a consequence, sparse and unreliable statistics.  In contrast to commodities such as cotton
and peanuts, which are sold almost exclusively on the international market, livestock is a tradeable
good whose market is primarily regional.  Consequently, the main challenge facing this subsector
was to reconquer its traditional regional markets by substituting for non-African beef that was
being heavily imported into the coastal countries.  
Before examining the changes in the trade, as reflected in official regional trade statistics on live
cattle exports, we examine briefly the changes in factors affecting regional livestock/meat trade.
Five factors explain trade flows of cattle and meat between Sahelian and coastal countries: the
offtake from Sahelian cattle herds, consumer demand in the Sahelian countries, consumer demand
in the coastal countries, livestock production in coastal countries, and non-Sahelian beef imports. 
The following section discusses recent trends in each of these factors.
After the devaluation, offtake from Sahelian cattle herds was stimulated by remunerative producer
prices that resulted from the effective transmission of large price consumer increases for meat
back to herders.  Despite an increase in input prices, especially in intensive production systems,
the profitability of cattle production increased.  Herd levels, on the other hand, historically
constrained by recurring droughts, increased over time less quickly than the human population. 
Thus, following large sales of cattle immediately after the devaluation in 1994, the increased
offtake rates from Sahelian herds could not be sustained.3Countries covered by the Council of Ministers of Agriculture of West and Central Africa, an
organization that is promoting regional trade.
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Sahelian consumer demand competes with exports for available supply.  The devaluation reduced 
real incomes in Sahelian countries, especially for urban consumers, who were faced with rising
prices of meat and nearly stagnant cash incomes.  Thus, local slaughter levels within the Sahelian
countries dropped at the expense of increased exports towards coastal countries.
Consumer demand for beef in coastal countries also has been decreasing.  In Cote d’Ivoire, for
example, annual per capita meat consumption dropped from 7.6 kilograms in 1986 to 4 kg in
1995 (Yade and Kanté 1998).  Total meat consumption there decreased from 79,880 tons in 1988
to 56,774 tons in 1996, a drop of 29%.  This fall can be explained partly by the rise in prices and
loss of consumers’ purchasing power following the devaluation.  The higher prices resulted from
the drastic reduction in supply, which was due to sharp fall in non-African beef imports, which
were not entirely offset by increased cattle imports from the Sahel.  The lower purchasing power
in coastal countries limited beef imports from Sahelian countries.  But the price increases in
coastal countries made Sahelian exports more competitive versus local slaughter in the Sahel.  
Livestock production in coastal countries, responding to livestock policy in Côte d’Ivoire and
Ghana, has risen in recent years, but without any real impact on imports, given these countries’
low levels of self-sufficiency in beef and rapid population growth.  Despite the coastal countries’
desire to develop their livestock industries, production in these countries has not constrained
Sahelian imports either before or after the devaluation.
Non-African beef imports into the coastal countries are a key determinant of trade within the
region, in the sense that they constitute one of the two main sources of supply (the other being
regional trade).   Competition between these two sources is nearly a zero-sum game--i.e.,
increased market share for one is gained at the expense of the other.  This competition is affected
primarily by the following factors: European Union policy on meat subsidies, Sahelian countries’
export policies, coastal countries’ import policies, CIF prices, and the constraints encountered by
Sahelian exporters.
The devaluation coincided with a favorable policy environment for Sahelian exporters,
characterized by a streamlining of export procedures, the reduction of massive export subsidies on
European beef, and the establishment by coastal country governments of compensatory import
taxes to offset the EU export subsidies. The competitiveness of Sahelian exports still is strongly
affected by high export marketing costs, particularly transport costs.  It costs $230 per ton of
meat equivalent to ship cattle from the Sahel to the coast, compared with only $80/ton for beef
shipped by non-African exporters from the world market to the West African coast..
The analysis of European Union foreign trade statistics reveals that the volume of beef and offal
exports to West and Central Africa (CMA/WCA)
3 decreased fell by 74% percent between 1991-
93 and 1995-97, while the value of those exports (in ECUs) dropped by 61%.  These exports,

















Figure 1.  Evolution of the Share of Exports in Total Offtake (in %) 
between 1995-1997.  They were dethroned by poultry exports, which saw their market share go
from 23% to 68% during the same period.  Moreover, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, which were
receiving more than half of CMA/WCA imports, have been relegated to second tier status by
Congo and Gabon.
Given all these factors, regional trade of cattle on the hoof has increased considerably since the
devaluation of the CFA franc. Over the period 1994-97, a larger share of local offtake in Burkina
Faso and Mali has gone to exports, at the expense of local slaughter.  Given the weak capacity of
actors to increase total supply of cattle in the short run to meet growing demand, market forces
have allocated more of the
existing supply to the
coastal countries, which
have stronger effective
demand than the Sahelian
countries.  
Figure 1 shows that in
Mali, the average share of
exports in total offtake has
increased from 23% in
1990-93 to 42% between
1994 and 1997.  In Burkina
Faso, the average share
increased from 40% before
the devaluation to 55%
after the devaluation.
Pressure on local slaughter in Burkina Faso is very strong, given the favorable price differential
between Ouagadougou and coastal cities like Abidjan and Accra.  
In absolute terms, in Burkina Faso and Mali, exports have increased 58 and 85%, respectively,
compared to the 1990-93 period,  while local slaughter has dropped 11 and 18 percent; these
figures exclude 1994 which was an exceptional year.  
In Burkina Faso, export sales have become less concentrated.  Before the devaluation (1990-93)
more than 90% of Burkina cattle exports went to Cote d’Ivoire.  While Ghana has absorbed 27%
of Burkina exports since the devaluation, the depreciation of the cedi to the CFA franc began to
slow this movement in the third quarter of 1995.  Despite the constant depreciation of the cedi,
however, the Ghanaian share of Burkina cattle exports increased to 37% in 1997.  This larger
share is probably due to the decision of the Ghanian government to reduce import tariffs in 1997.
Even though Sahelian exports have not completely compensated for the decline in  non-African
meat imports into  coastal markets, the devaluation together with the reduction of European beef
subsidies and creation of compensatory import taxes, have nevertheless contributed to the
recovery of Sahelian livestock industry and the recapturing of market share in Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire.4 Analysis for the period 1992/93 -1998/99 is based on production data from DIAPER/CILSS for CILSS
countries and from FAO for other countries. 
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3.2  Cereals
Cereals - rice and maize, millet and sorghum - are another set of commodities that are widely
traded among West African countries, but whose flows are poorly documented by official
statistics.  The importance of this trade has been corroborated by other more focused studies and
is consistent with analyses (discussed below) of the correlation of agricultural production and of
market integration in the region, as well as a comparison of  price differentials with transport
costs. Prior to presenting the results of analysis of available national statistics, we will first
examine the potential for cereals trade in the region. 
3.2.1 Changes in Trade Potential
Correlation of Production
4:   This section analyzes the opportunities for regional trade by looking
at the probability that a cereal-deficit country could satisfy its food needs by importing from a
neighboring food-surplus country.  In other words, this analysis examines whether agricultural
production is positively correlated between different countries.  If it is, the future development of
regional trade may be constrained even if that trade is driven primarily by effective demand (“the
market”).  A positive correlation implies that a drop in production in one country would likely be
accompanied by a drop in production in the surrounding countries, making all the countries
“short” of grain at the same time.  Therefore, there would be little room for regional trade to
smooth out supplies.  Conversely, the absence of any significant positive correlation, or the
presence of significant negative correlation, would broaden the scope for regional trade; 
production shortfalls in one country would be accompanied by no change in production, or even a
production increase, in neighboring countries. In such a situation, regional trade can help stabilize
national markets.
No country in the region is self-sufficient in rice.  Even if all countries import rice, however,
certain countries are also rice exporters.  Rice exports are not only re-exports of rice imported in
excess of national consumption needs.  There are countries, such as Mali, that have adopted the
strategy of exporting higher-value local rice while importing a lower quality rice from the world
market to make up the deficit.  Limited purchasing power of poorer groups of the population
prevents them from buying the preferred local rice, particularly during the hungry season when
prices are highest.  People at these income levels turn to the lower quality imported rice, which
has the additional advantage of expanding more than local rice during cooking and is thus able to
more cheaply feed the family.  This import/export strategy could be expanded through the further
development of irrigated rice schemes in Mali, particularly in the Office du Niger zone. 
The degree to which countries satisfy national cereal needs with local production varies widely. 
National production in Mali, Guinea and Nigeria satisfies 80% of their total cereal needs, while
Ghana, Mauritania and Senegal only meet 40% of their requirements.  In fact, 80% of the region’s
cereal imports from outside of West Africa are accounted for by Senegal, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire5The reversal of trade came about because it was no longer profitable following the devaluation to re-
export rice imported from the world market to Mali.  After 1994, Malian rice began to become competitive in
certain markets in Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea.
11
and Ghana.  Considering Mali’s potential exportable surplus, which stems from the growth of
production in the Office du Niger zone (see below), and the absence of any positive correlation of
Mali’s rice production with that of the largest rice importers in the region (with the exception of
Ghana), an expanded rice trade in the region is highly foreseeable in the future (see annex table
A2). 
For coarse grains (millet, sorghum, maize), production in the largest producing countries (Nigeria,
Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) is not significantly correlated (table A2).  Nigeria’s production is
negatively correlated with that in Mali and Burkina Faso.  And production in Burkina Faso and
Mali, the two countries that have the potential to be the largest coarse grain exporters in West
Africa, is not significantly correlated with that of other countries.  The correlation coefficients
tend to be negative (although not statistically significant), a sign indicating a potential for regional
trade. This same pattern applies between Niger and Nigeria, the former’s main source of supply. 
Market Integration:  The integration of markets is another factor important in promoting regional
trade of coarse grains.  Price correlation coefficients are a tool to measure market integration. 
Although they require caution in their interpretation (Harriss 1979), correlation coefficients
(Annex table A3) indicate the extent to which prices in different markets move together.   
The analysis of monthly cereal prices in 1992/93 (prior to the devaluation) in four capital cities
(Bamako, Dakar, Niamey and Ouagadougou) reveal very few positive correlations.   The only
significant correlations were between Dakar and the following markets: Bamako and Niamey for
millet, Ouagadougou for sorghum, and Bamako for maize.  After the devaluation (1994-1997),
however, prices for every cereal were significantly correlated between every combination of cities. 
This development reflects not only the impact of the devaluation, but also the result of efforts
over the last ten years to liberalize the economies and expand regional trade in countries in the
region.
Barry et al. (1998) used more sophisticated methods to measure market integration for rice in the
region, notably between Malian markets and those in Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Niger and Senegal
between 1993 and 1996.  Using the Gordon model, they arrived at the following conclusion:
“... Malian markets and those in neighboring countries seem ... badly integrated due to a thin trade
in rice and high transport costs ... but the level of integration between Malian markets and sub-
regional markets seems to have improved after the devaluation ... the direction of trade between
Mali and certain regional markets such as northern Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea, reversed [following
the devaluation]....
5
Price Differentials: If the correlation analyses of cereal production and of prices point out two
necessary conditions for trade between two countries in the region, notably the existence of6 Even if there are short-term losses, profits must outweigh losses in the long term. 
7DIAPER (Diagnostique Permanente) is a CILSS program aimed at improving agricultural production
and trade statistics of CILSS member states.
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surplus for one country and a deficit in another, and the connection of two regions by a market,
one additional and fundamental condition must be met.  Such trade must be profitable.
6  In other
words, in addition to the first two conditions, it is necessary that the price differential between
markets in two countries covers transport costs and the margins of the different economic actors.  
It is well documented that transport costs constitute a major obstacle to trade in the region.
In Annex Figure A1, the difference between the wholesale prices of maize, millet and sorghum in
Bamako and the consumer prices in Dakar/Tilene is compared to the cost of rail transport - the
most economical mode of transport - for the period 1992-97.  In order to increase trade flows, the
price differential must cover marketing costs and margins of the exporter, wholesaler and retailer. 
After the devaluation, margins for maize improved significantly.  For millet and sorghum, with the
exception of 1995 and 1997, margins were negative, and even in 1995 and 1997, the margins
were much lower than those for maize.
More recent analysis of these maize margins between Mali and Senegal for the period October
1998 to March 1999 reconfirm these findings.  For rice, millet and maize during the same period,
however, margin analysis revealed that trade potential was weak between the two countries. 
Estimates of export margins of the four cereals between Mali and Cote d’Ivoire also augurs well
for future trade (PASIDMA/OMA/INSAH-PRISAS 1999).
3.2.2.  Evolution of Regional Trade
Annex table A4 provides information on coarse grains exports from CILSS countries between
1987/88 and 1998/99, based on data obtained from the series of annual cereals balance sheets
published by DIAPER.
7  Official data capture exports mainly Mali prior to the devaluation, and
only from Mali after the devaluation. It’s clear that this does not entirely reflect reality, and for
this reason, we will analyze broad trends in regional trade rather than a detailed statistical analysis
of official data.
To illustrate, however, we will focus on Mali’s exports.  Its recorded exports of coarse grains
increased considerably after the devaluation, moving from an annual average of 7,468 m.t.
between 1987/88 and 1992/93 to 30,000 m.t. between 1994/95 and 1998/99, i.e. an increase on
the order of 300%.  Over the same period, the coefficient of variation of its exports fell from 93%
to 64%.  It’s worth noting that the production of these cereals did not significantly increase in
Mali after the devaluation.  Without doubt, the substitution by certain countries in the region of
cheaper millet, sorghum, and maize, obtained through regional trade, for their previous imports
from the world market, influenced both coarse grain prices and cereals flows from Mali.8In Mali, traders who wish to export products must make a prior declaration of their export intentions to
the government, even though such a declaration does not oblige the trader to carry out the exportation, nor does it
expose him/her to any additional taxes.  (The declaration requirement is part of a government effort to improve





(‘000 000 CFA F)
Onion Mali +125% 17061
Senegal +70% 24717
Burkina n.a. 4400
Potato Mali  (+) n.a.   9 150 
Senegal -40%  1 870




(‘000 000 CFA F)
Green Beans Mali +93%   685
Senegal +26% 3 510
Burkina -8 à -24% 1 995
Table 6.  : Indicators of Horticultural Sector Performance: 1993-96
Annex tables A5 and A6 show declared cereals export intentions by Malian traders between 1990
and 1998.
8  Declared export intentions concern mainly millet and sorghum throughout the period,
with the exception of 1994, the year of the devaluation.  During that year, there was a strong
demand for maize from countries that normally import it from the world market, such as Senegal. 
However, this competitiveness of Malian maize was quickly lost due to the rapid increase in local
maize prices.  For example, during the last few years, the largest Senegalese importer has been
regularly importing 25,000 m.t. of maize from the world market every year.
The most important export destinations for Malian cereals traders have been Côte d’Ivoire and
Senegal, especially right after the devaluation, as shown by the graphs in Annex Figure A1.  These
two countries have good seaports and hence are well integrated into the world market.  They
were replaced as the main export destinations by two landlocked countries, Burkina Faso and
Niger, in 1998, which was a bad production year in those two countries.  Trade between these
two countries and Mali can reverse from year to year, depending on local production conditions.
3.3 Horticultural products:   African Markets–Engine of Development? 
The quality of data on horticultural production and trade is similar to that in the livestock sector, 
making it difficult both to predict
and to measure quantitatively the
evolution of intra-regional trade in
horticultural products.
Recognizing these limits, we
analyzed the post-devaluation
evolution of the subsector and the
potential for regional trade for a
number of important crops --
onions, garlic, tomatoes, potatoes
and green beans.
The value of production and trade
for the products studied raises a
key question: Will the African
regional market be the motor of
development for the horticultural sector?  Information in Table 6 suggests that the answer to this
question is yes.  The subsector response for products targeted primarily at regional markets
(onions, tomatoes, garlic, and even potatoes in Mali) was stronger after the devaluation than was
the response of products aimed at the European export market (green beans from Burkina Faso
and export quality potatoes (‘primeur’) from Senegal).  Production increased significantly for
onions in Mali and Senegal, and for tomatoes in Benin.  Precise numbers are not available for9 Potatoes (other than export quality ‘primeur’ in Senegal), although much less consumed than onions
and tomatoes, have entered into regional consumption habits, particularly those of urban consumers, hence we
include them in the category of "basic" products. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of West and Central African Imports of Basic
Horticultural Products: 1993-96 (Source: FAOSTAT 1998)
onion and garlic production in Chad and potatoes in Mali, but it appears that this production,
destined primarily for regional markets (Congo, Central African Republic, and Côte d’Ivoire, for
example) increased substantially after the devaluation. By contrast, exports of green beans from
Burkina Faso dropped by 10-20%.  The value of onion production in Mali, Senegal and Burkina
Faso reached 46 billion CFA F, much higher than the 6.2 billion CFA F generated by exports of
green beans from the same countries, despite an increase in green bean exports from Senegal
(26%) and Mali (93%). 
The lack of data on regional trade and imports does not permit a precise analysis of what is
driving the consumption of  the increased production since the devaluation: substitution for
European imports, increases in consumption, or exports to the regional market. Following the
devaluation, it seems that increases in local production substituted partly for European imports to
West and Central Africa, which decreased in 1994 and 1995 (figure 2), and that regional trade
increased (potatoes and, to a lesser extent, onions from Mali; and onions from Chad). 
Surprisingly, imports into West and Central Africa have increased since 1995 and reached, in
some countries, levels that are higher than pre-devaluation ones (e.g., onions in Senegal).  But
these import increases were not accompanied by drops in local production.  On the contrary,
onion production is still increasing in Senegal and Mali, suggesting higher local consumption and
probably more regional trade.
It is dangerous to conclude from our study of only five crops and six countries that the African
market for “basic” horticultural products (onions, tomatoes, potatoes, and garlic) could generate
more income than European export markets, but aggregate import/export data for West and
Central Africa suggest this might be the case for most countries (Table 7).  The average annual
value of “basic” horticultural
imports
9 for these regions was
US$98.493 million (1993-1996).
Total fruit and vegetable exports
from the two regions generated
about three times more income
than was spent on basic imports,
but 72% of these exports were
concentrated in two countries:
Ivory Coast (primarily pineapples)
and Cameroon. Excluding these
exceptional cases, we find that
fruit and vegetable exports covered only 79% of “basic” horticultural imports, suggesting that
each country needs to carefully evaluate the costs and benefits of import substitution versus
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0QVG ￿ ￿C￿ +PENWFGU CNN HTWKVU CPF XGIGVCDNGU￿ ￿D￿ 1PKQPU KPENWFGU UJCNNQVU
Table 7.  Average Annual Value of Horticultural Imports and
Exports in West and Central Africa (WCA):1993-1996
There are a number of factors that
contributed to the rapid growth in the
supply of these “basic” products.  First,
devaluation made local production more
competitive with European imports.  In
addition, these products exhibit demand
and marketing characteristics that
facilitate subsector expansion: Onions,
tomatoes, and garlic:
& represent an important share of
total vegetable consumption
throughout the West and Central
African regions (10-25% for
onions, 7-39% for tomatoes);
& are ‘basic food products’
consumed almost daily by both
urban and rural households rather
than ‘luxury products’ consumed primarily in urban areas, restaurants, and wealthier
households.  Rural consumption is particularly important because most evidence suggests
that the bulk of the income gains from the devaluation have accrued in rural areas.
& are imported from Europe by many countries in the region, even after the devaluation
(Figure 2);
& can be stored and/or processed more easily -especially onions- than most horticultural
products.
Potatoes do not exhibit all of these characteristics, particularly the strong local demand; this might
explain the relatively weaker post-devaluation response for this subsector.
 
In brief, the African demand for “basic” horticultural products is substantial.  Our hypothesis is
that with an appropriate mix of policies and investments African producers should be able to
remain competitive and expand production of these products with less effort than it would take to
expand into niche export markets (such as the green bean and ‘primeur’ potato markets recently
targeted by Burkina Faso and Senegal) which are characterized by:
& weak local and regional demand, hence heavy reliance on European demand;
& strong competition in European markets by well-established exporters;
& difficult enforcement and litigation of international production and marketing contracts;
& very demanding quality, storage, and packaging requirements;10 The fact that Dakar is a port helps reduce the transport costs for imported rice delivered to the city; this
contrasts sharply with rice imports to Mali, which must be shipped overland by train from Dakar or by truck from
Abidjan.
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4.  IMPACT OF THE DEVALUATION ON THE PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT
In this section we examine the response of different categories of actors to the opportunities and
challenges presented by the devaluation and the impact that these responses have had on
aggregate production and productivity.
4.1 Evidence on Micro-level Response
4.1.1 Changes in Production Systems and Technologies
In situations where the general policy environment was favorable to agricultural growth (e.g.,
progress made toward market liberalization and improvements in government fiscal balances) and
prior investments had been made to support agricultural productivity or market development (e.g.
roads, irrigation, market information systems), the devaluation-induced changes in input/output
price relationships appear to have had a positive impact on stimulating farm level investments and
agricultural intensification.  The Office du Niger, or ON (Mali’s main irrigated rice area), is a case
in point.   
In the post-devaluation period, we found that many ON farmers increased rice yields substantially
by switching from broadcast seeding to transplanting rice started in nurseries and/or using more
organic and inorganic fertilizer on these crops (Table 8).  There was also increased diversification
into dry-season horticultural products such as onions and tomatoes, accompanied by increases in
use of organic and inorganic fertilizers.  This diversification and input use increases the annual
productivity of land and irrigation investments well beyond what can be produced with a single
rice crop (or even a double rice crop, because dry-season rice yields are quite low).   Both rice
intensification and diversification into horticulture were stimulated by increased demand for the
products; this demand came not only from Malian consumers but also from other countries in the
region (primarily Cote d’Ivoire, but also Ghana). 
Farmers producing rice under irrigated conditions in the Senegal River Valley did not respond
positively to the devaluation.  Both fertilizer use and aggregate production declined.   The factors
affecting this response are numerous.  Among the most important are: (1) delayed liberalization of
rice marketing in Senegal (not seriously undertaken until after the devaluation), (2) greater price
competition from imports of low-quality (broken) Asian rice in the major rice consuming area of
the country -- Dakar
10, (3) relatively small producer price increases after devaluation (28% in
Senegal vs. 48% in Mali), and (4) larger fertilizer price increases. 17
Table 8.  Fertilizer Use Following the Devaluation









c Mali Urea 169 27%
DAP 97 18%
Senegal Urea 200 -13%
DAP 100 -23%
Cotton Burkina NPK  (Complexe Coton) 141 -13%
Mali NPK (Complexe Coton) 117 4%
Senegal NPK (Complexe Coton) 156 5%
Chad NPK (Complexe Coton)n . a .
Maize Burkina NPK sb 163 -31%
Mali Sud NPK sb 100 37%
Sources: Rice: Mariko, Chohin-Kuper, and Kelly (1999) and Liagre (1997). Cotton/maize: Tefft et al., 1998a.
Notes:
a Years covered: for rice (average of 1995/96 and 1996/97), for cotton and maize (1996/97)
b Years compared: for rice (1992/93-1993/94 vs. 1995/96-1996/97), for cotton and maize (1993/94 vs. 1996/97)
c Rice data concern irrigated rice in the Office du Niger, Mali and in the Senegal River Basin, Senegal.
The response of CFA zone farmers operating under rainfed conditions tended to be one of
extensification rather than intensification.  For example, average annual cotton area for the 1994-
96 period was higher in Burkina Faso (7%) and Mali (61%) than it was during the pre-devaluation
period (1990-93), yet yields were lower (-2% for Burkina Faso and -12% for Mali).  In Senegal,
due probably to less pass-through of devaluation benefits to the producer, both the area and the
yield impacts were negative (-23% for area and -20% for yields). Not only have yields declined in
all countries for which the data are available, but the return to extensive practices raises concerns
about long-run negative impacts on soil quality. 
Farmers frequently  increased the use of manure to compensate for declining use of inorganic
fertilizers, but quantities used were generally not an adequate substitute for the nutrients lost
through diminished use of inorganic fertilizers (Tefft et al. 1998b).  The cotton area increase is
attributable to reductions in fallows, new land being cleared and brought under cultivation, and a
substitution of cotton for food crops.  In Mali, the percentage of cotton area in the agricultural
system of the cotton zone increased from 21% to 30% between 1994/95 and 1997/98 (Dakar and
Healy 1999).18
In some cases (Mali, in particular), the cotton company responded to the devaluation-led increase
in pesticide costs by selecting a lower-cost substitute.  According to some farmers surveyed, the
substitute was not as effective as the pre-devaluation product and, therefore, contributed to the
lower post-devaluation yields.
In Mali, changes in input/output price ratios following the devaluation appear to have been less
favorable for rice than for cotton, yet there has been more intensification of the former crop.  As
suggested above, a number of factors contributed to the stronger response by rice producers: (1)
prior investment in rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure (by the government as well as by
farmers) combined with good research and extension programs had increased the general
agronomic potential for rice in the ON, (2) opportunities for technical increases in yield were
particularly strong in rice zones that had not yet shifted from broadcast seeding to transplanting,
(3) land constraints in the ON were greater than in the cotton zone, providing more incentive for
intensification, (4) government policies to protect urban consumers from cereal price inflation
were well-chosen and implemented (i.e., demand and prices for high-quality ON rice remained
strong in both national and export markets, while imports of lower quality Asian rice were
encouraged to meet the demand of low-income consumers). 
There is some evidence that farmers’ desire to ensure food security in the cotton zones led to a
shift of fertilizer from cotton to maize crops following the devaluation, with fertilizer use on maize
increasing as much as 70% from 1994/95 to 1997/98 (Doucouré and Healy1999) .  This shift of
fertilizer from cotton to maize suggests that farmers were implementing a program of cereal
intensification to free up land for less intensive cotton production.  If maize varieties grown in the
region are more fertilizer responsive than cotton, this could be a more cost-effective use of
fertilizer, even if it does reduce cotton yields.
For the beef sector, too, the increased prices for inputs pushed producers to change their
strategies, with the aim of reducing costs in order to profit from the devaluation (Yade et al. 
1998).  Senegalese cattle feeders experimented with reducing the length of the feeding cycle or
adopted a forage-based feeding system.  Wholesale butchers there also changed their strategies;
faced with an increase in purchase prices, they vertically integrated by going to buy animals
directly in the production areas.
Malian livestock producers increased the number of old cull cows being sold and some shifted
toward animals with shorter reproductive cycles.  Although not statistically documented, it
appears that livestock feeding/fattening activities increased in certain localities, such as Bamako,
Segou and Sikasso.
The large increase in the price of heifers recently observed in the Malian and Burkina Faso
markets suggests that herds are now being rebuilt.  This can be taken as an indication of herders’
intentions to increase production.
At the level of meat processing and marketing in Mali, the distinction between the functions of the
wholesale and retail butcher is becoming blurred.  The “classical” role of the wholesale butcher is19
progressively disappearing in favor of the butcher who holds a license to slaughter his own
animals and who also custom-slaughters for his colleagues who do not have such a license.
In sum, there are numerous examples of how producers in both the crop and livestock sectors
have adjusted production practices and technologies in an effort to take advantage of the
opportunities offered and the constraints imposed by the devaluation.
4.1.2 Investments
Survey data show some evidence of farmer investments in productive assets following the
devaluation.  This was particularly true for farmers in the ON zone of Mali.  For example, Malian
rice producers continued to invest in small-scale rice mills -- something they had begun before the
devaluation due to the inefficiency of parastatal facilities for industrial processing. The
privatization of the industrial mills in 1996 and their resumption of activities in 1997 raise some
questions about the continued competitiveness of the small scale mills, but it is too soon to tell if
there is room in the market for both types of processing.  Malian rice farmers also invested in
traction animals and equipment and continued to invest substantial amounts of labor in
maintaining/leveling irrigated parcels. In addition, some village associations were able to invest in
large scale equipment such as threshers.
In the Senegalese horticultural sector, there was some early investment by private sector firms
(with donor credit support) in cold storage facilities for onions and potatoes.  There was also
some investment in farm-level storage facilities in Chad (in conjunction with an Africare project)
that enabled farmers to realize more profit by selling onions when prices were higher.
Some of the investments mentioned by farmers were not direct investments in agriculture but ones
that could contribute indirectly to more efficient farm/household operations: new houses or
additions to existing ones (including more space for crop storage) and improved means of
transport (motorcycles, bikes).  There has also been substantial community investment in new
schools and health clinics in those areas of Mali that have benefitted from the devaluation-induced
cotton and cattle booms (Tefft, Staatz, and Dioné 1997).  Many women horticultural farmers
purchased jewelry.   (It is not clear if this was viewed as a means of savings/investment or simply
a consumption expenditure).
4.2 Impact on Production
Comparisons of figures on aggregate cereal production before (average 1990-1993) and after
(average 1994-1998) the devaluation show a 20% increase in rice production for the five CILSS
countries, compared with only a 10% increase for coarse grains (Table 9) . However, situations
differ among countries with a strong cereal production increase in Chad (+39%) due primarily to
gains in coarse grains. Average rice production in Burkina Faso and Mali rose by 83 % and 44 %,
respectively, whereas in Senegal -- an outlier with respect to rice patterns -- production dropped 
by 12%.11  Information in Table 8 suggests that growth rates in Chad may have been as favorable for coarse
grains as those in Niger, but we did not have adequate data to estimate a growth rate for Chad.
12Although Doucouré and Healy report that Malian farmers reduced their coarse grains area in favor of
cotton, their results only apply to the cotton zone (CMDT), while the figures in Table 11, showing an increase in
coarse grain area, refer to the entire country.
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Estimated rates of growth in cereal production for 1993/94 - 1998/99 shown in Table 10 further
confirm that rice production is advancing more rapidly than coarse grain production in Cote
d’Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso (rates ranging from 6% to 11% for rice vs. <3% for coarse
grains). In Senegal, both rice and coarse grain growth rates are negative (-7 and -4%,
respectively), while in Niger rice is declining (-6%) and coarse grains are advancing (+7%). Niger
is the only country represented in Table 10 where coarse grain growth was positive and
statistically significant; rates for two countries were negative and significant, while rates for the
remaining two countries were not statistically different from zero (i.e., stagnant).
11
Although coarse grains still account for the bulk (about 90 %) of cereals produced in the 4
Sahelian countries considered in Table 10, production of these crops has not progressed much.
Yields remain highly dependent on rainfall and intensification is not evident except in Mali, where
fertilizer use on maize is progressing (Table 8) and yields have increased by 16% since the
devaluation (Table 11).
Growth in aggregate cereal production is a function of changes in area planted as well as yield
growth. Table 11 shows that for the case of rice in both Burkina Faso and Mali, growth in area
cultivated was the primary reason for increases in aggregate rice production; yields appear to have
declined slightly (data refer both irrigated and non-irrigated crops).  However, in Mali, the context
of liberalization of cereal markets enhanced by the devaluation stimulated intensification of rice
production in the large-scale irrigated schemes of the Office of Niger.  Yields in this zone
increased by 27% from 3.2 to 4.1 T/ha on average (Mariko, Chohin-Kuper, and  Kelly 1999). 
Changes in the amount of area devoted to coarse grains was mixed -- stagnant or declining in
Burkina Faso and Senegal but increasing in Mali and Niger.  In Burkina, the drop in coarse grain
area was accompanied by yield increases for both maize and sorghum/millet (12%), while in
Senegal maize yields declined (-9%) and millet/sorghum yields increased (5%).  Mali and Niger
exhibited generally positive moves for both coarse grain area and yields.
12  Malian farmers showed
the most enthusiasm for maize, with both areas and yields increasing 16%, while millet/sorghum
yields remained stagnant and areas increased slightly (5%).  Maize area in Niger, starting from a
very low base, increased by 312% and yields by 3%; millet/sorghum area increased slightly (2%)
and yields by 11% (but remaining at <300 kg/ha on average).  By combining information provided
in Tables 9-11, we conclude that there is not strong evidence of Sahel-wide intensification, area
expansion, or increased aggregate production for coarse grains following the devaluation, but
simply a few individual country situations where particular coarse grains made some advances.21
Table 9. Cereal Production in Metric Tons: 1990-93 vs. 1994-98
Country
Cereals 1990-1993 1994-1998 %change
Burkina Faso Rice 50,203 91,922 83%
Millet/maize/sorghum/other 2,186,130 2,244,630 3%
Wheat 0 0 0%
All cereals 2,236,333 2,336,552 4%
Mali Rice 393,588 567,280 44%
Millet/maize/sorghum/other 1,732,475 1,733,450 0%
Wheat 2,130 4,690 120%
All cereals 2,128,193 2,305,420 8%
Niger Rice 71,741 62,830 -12%
Millet/maize/sorghum/other 1,922,605 2,244,178 17%
Wheat 8,941 4,570 -49%
All cereals 2,003,287 2,311,578 15%
Senegal Rice 202,488 178,020 -12%
Millet/maize/sorghum/other 787,580 803,028 2%
Wheat 0 0 0%
All cereals 990,068 981,048 -1%
Chad Rice 78,767 95,950 22%
Millet/maize/sorghum/other 670,648 946,098 41%
Wheat 2,500 2,666 7%
All cereals 751,915 1,044,714 39%
CILSS Rice 987,209 1,194,352 20%
Millet/maize/sorghum/other 7,508,798 8,227,690 10%
Wheat 13,571 11,926 -12%
All cereals 8,509,578 9,433,968 11%
Source: CILSS/DIAPER
 22
Table 10.   Estimated Cereal Production Growth Rates (%):  1993/94 to 1998/99
Rice (paddy) Coarse Grains Total cereals
Burkina Faso +10.56** -2.86* -2.43*
Mali +9.57** -1.79 0.73
Niger -5.53** +6.88** +6.48**
Senegal -6.85** -4.09** -4.59**
Côte d’Ivoire +6.18** 1.53 +4.38**
Source : Authors’ calculation from DIAPER data for CILSS countries and FAOSTAT for Côte d’Ivoire.
* Regression coefficient significant at 95% level;  ** Regression coefficient significant at 99% level.
Country averages for other crops (groundnuts, cotton, and sugar cane) shown in Table 11 exhibit
few signs of intensification following the devaluation except for groundnuts in Niger, where yields
increased by 50% (but remain about 50 % of the yields obtained in other countries); small
percentage increases were realized for groundnuts in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal (15%,
10%, and 5%, respectively).  Sugarcane yields in Mali also increased slightly (8%).  Burkina
Faso’s cotton yields were down by 2% in the post-devaluation period, Mali’s by12%, and
Senegal’s by 20%.
Horticultural crops show increases in area and production for crops targeted primarily to the local
market (see section 3.3) in response to favorable producer prices. These increases were possible
where input supply systems were efficient and transport and credit were not major constraints
(e.g., in the ON zone, where inputs and transport were already in place for rice producers). The
higher producer prices also resulted in increases in producer revenues for onions in Senegal, Mali
and Chad, potatoes in Mali and tomatoes in Benin.
In general, even if the official statistics cannot be considered terribly reliable, it is clear that cattle
producers responded favorably to the price incentives by massive destocking in 1994.  The
recovery of the beef subsector in Mali was full of contrasts.  After a very strong reaction to the
favorable conditions in 1994, characterized by a substantial increase (on the order of 58%) in
recorded offtake compared with 1993, the level of offtake fell in 1995 and 1996 to levels
comparable to those prior to the devaluation.  Nonetheless, in 1997, offtake levels were back up
to 18% above the levels of 1990-93.  Is this a case of one-time increase?  Or is it the consequence
of producers adapting to the new situation, three years after the devaluation?  Without doubt,
we’ll have to wait for a few years to see whether this “trend” toward higher offtake is confirmed.
In Burkina Faso, the increase in offtake was more modest in 1994 but, in contrast, seems to have
been more sustained.  Compared with the level of 1990/93, offtake increased by 30% in 1994 and,
despite a drop in 1995, it has thereafter settled at a level 17% above that of the pre-devaluation
period (1990-93).23
5.  CONCLUSIONS
The devaluation of the CFA Franc led to a reversal of the decline in GNP per capita prevailing in
most of the countries in the West African Franc zone since the late 1980s.  The devaluation was
also accompanied by a significant reduction in budget deficits for these countries.
For the agricultural sector, the devaluation appears to have stimulated an increase in the level of
agricultural value added as well as the agricultural sector’s share in GDP.  Food imports as a
share of total agricultural exports have declined for all countries in the zone but Senegal, where
agricultural exports fell precipitously after the devaluation.
Although lacking precise data, it appears that regional trade in food products has increased more
than food production, resulting in an increase in food prices accompanied by a decline in
consumption per capita in certain cases.  This tendency is particularly apparent for products
previously  imported heavily from outside the region, for which local production is now
substituting.
Growth in demand for products that exhibited good price transmission to producers (sectors with
limited direct state involvement in marketing) was expected to stimulate growth in production.  
For rice, the response from producers in the Malian Office du Niger was as anticipated: strong
growth in both production and productivity.  The same tendency was found among rice producers 
in Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, with the key difference that in the latter two countries
production went toward domestic consumption, whereas a significant portion of the increase in
Malian production was exported elsewhere in the region.
Horticultural production in the region also increased, as did intra-regional trade in horticultural
products and imports from the world market for many countries.  This combination of changes
suggests an aggregate increase in the consumption of horticultural products in the region
following the devaluation, perhaps due to income growth, particularly in rural areas.
Probably the greatest increase in regional trade was found in the livestock (beef cattle) subsector
following the devaluation.  The increased trade was due in large part to coastal countries
substituting Sahelian production for European imports.  Prior to the devaluation, producers had
been overstocking the range, as the demand for Sahelian production (and therefore prices) was
very low.  Immediately after the devaluation was announced in 1994, producers rapidly began
selling animals to compensate for the prolonged period of overstocking.  Although offtake rates
declined after the first year, they remain higher than the predevaluation period.24
Table 11.   Evolution of Area and Yields by Crop and Country
 
Area (‘000 ha) Yields (T/ha)
90-93 94-96 % 90-93 94-96 %
Burkina Faso
Millet/sorghum 2567 2594 1% 0.73 0.82 12%
Rice 21.7 40.5 87% 2.3 2.1 -9%
Maize 239 198 -17% 1.28 1.43 12%
Cotton 171 183 7% 0.93 0.91 -2%
Groundnut 195 243 25% 0.74 0.85 15%
Mali
Millet/sorghum 1969 2073 5% 0.72 0.72 0%
Rice 195 300 54% 2 1.7 -15%
Maize 201 234 16% 1.16 1.34 16%
Cotton 206 332 61% 1.28 1.13 -12%
Groundnut 194 187 -4% 0.84 0.92 10%
Sugar cane 4.5 3.6 -20% 66 71 8%
Niger
Millet/sorghum 6940 7107 2% 0.27 0.3 11%
Rice n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Maize 2.5 10.4 316% 0.37 0.38 3%
Groundnut 113 280 148% 0.29 0.44 52%
Senegal
Millet/sorghum 1005 1058 5% 0.66 0.69 5%
Rice 75 74 -1% 2.4 2.1 -12%
Maize 105 102 -3% 1.15 1.05 -9%
Cotton 44 34 -23% 1.28 1.03 -20%
Groundnut 853 863 1% 0.76 0.8 5%
Source: CILSS/DIAPER, except for cotton (Tefft et al. 1998a), and groundnuts in Mali (République du Mali
1998), groundnuts in Senegal (Ministry of Agriculture cited in Freud et al. 1997), and rice, millet/sorghum in
Senegal (GOS/MDRH/DS cited by Duruflé 1996).
Notes: Senegal cereals average for 1994-95 only; Niger figures for maize do not include 1991, for which data are missing.25
Producers’ reaction to the opening up of regional trade following the devaluation has been mixed. 
Subsectors benefitting the most from the regional trade stimulated by the devaluation were ones
that had already benefitted from liberalization and also had good access to inputs and general
infrastructure (roads, markets, irrigation) -- the horticultural producers and rice producers in the
irrigated perimeters of the Office du Niger, for example.  Nevertheless, very high levels of debt
among these producers continues to threaten the long-run sustainability of these relatively short-
run gains.
By contrast, production increases responding strictly to changes in relative prices rather than to a
more complete ‘package’ of policy reforms and investments, appear to be less durable.  This is
currently the case with the coarse grain and livestock subsectors, two subsectors that benefitted
from substantial producer price increases, but remain do not show signs of ‘intensification’
leading to increased factor productivity.  Cotton production also expanded rapidly, but again
mainly through extensification.
The devaluation can only help spur long-term agricultural transformation if it is accompanied by
basic changes in the production environment -- the types of changes that come from investments
to reduce production costs and increase the quality of the output.  A key question for many
subsectors is whether the increased earnings stemming from the devaluation will be channeled
back into public and private investments that will bring about these basic changes in the
production environment.  Whether this will occur will depend on individual producers’ investment
and consumption decisions and on public decisions regarding taxation and public expenditures.
Finally, even for the subsectors having made substantial progress after the devaluation, much
more could be accomplished if governments would respond to some of the challenges associated
with the expansion of regional trade -- for example, the poor transport infrastructure in the region
that renders producer prices low, input prices high, and input deliveries frequently too late to be
of use.  Regional approaches to reducing these problems are needed if producers are to intensify
production, find remunerative markets and have the devaluation serve as an engine of agricultural
transformation.26
6.  REFERENCES
Barry, Abdoul W., Salif B. Diarra, and Daouda Diarra.  1998. “Promouvoir les exportations de riz
malien vers les pays de la sous-région.”  Rapport final.  Equity and Growth through
Economic Research (EAGER).  Cambridge, MA: Associates for International Resources
and Development.
CILSS/DIAPER regional agricultural production data base.
Direction des Affaires Economiques du Mali, unpublished data.
Doucouré C.O., and S. Healy. 1999. “Evolution des systèmes de production de 1994/95 à
1997/98. Impact sur les revenus des paysans”. Bamako: CMDT.
Duruflé, G. 1996. Tendances de l’agriculture sénégalaise. Dakar: Banque Mondiale.
FAOSTAT. 1998.  FAO on-line database.
Freud, C., E.H. Freud, J. Richard, R. Thénevin. 1997. L'Arachide au Senegal: un moteur en
panne.  Paris: Editions Karthala.
Harriss, B. 1979.  “There is Method in My Madness: or Is it Vice Versa? Measuring Agricultural
Market Performance,” in Food Research Studies, Vol. 17 no.2: 197-218.
Kelly V., and Anne Chohin-Kuper. 1998. Food Security and Agricultural Subserctors in West
Africa. Future Prospects and Key Issues Four Years after the Devaluation of the CFA
Franc. Horticultural Subsector. Policy Synthesis. Bamako: CILSS/INSAH.
Liagre L. 1997. “Les effets de la dévaluation du Franc CFA et des politiques de libéralisation sur
la filière riz irrigué de la région du Fleuve Sénégal.”  Dakar:  OSIRIZ.
Mariko D., A. Chohin-Kuper, and V. Kelly. 1999. “La filière riz à l’Office du Niger au Mali. Une
nouvelle dynamique depuis la dévaluation du Franc CFA.” Bamako:  IER/INSAH.
PASIDMA (Projet d’Appui au Système d’Information Décentralisé des Marchés Agricoles),
OMA (Observatoire du Marché Agricole), and INSAH/PRISAS. 1999. Perspectives
d’évolution du marché agricole de l’Afrique de l’Ouest : Campagne 1998/99.  Bamako:
May.
République du Mali, Ministère du Développement Rural et de l’Eau, Cellule de Planification et de
Statistique (CPS).  1998.  Recueil des Statistiques du Secuteur Rural Malien.  Bamako. 27
Tefft James, John Staatz, and Josué Dioné. 1997.  “Impact of the CFA Devaluation on
Sustainable Growth for Poverty Alleviation: Preliminary Results.” Bamako:
INSAH/PRISAS, September.
Tefft J., Y. Tiendrebeogo, D. Kebe, Y. Abdelwahid, A. Diouf, L. Diakite, and J.C. Le Vallée.
1998a. “Filière coton africain: étude comparative régionale, rentabilité, revenus et
contraintes.” Bamako: CILSS/INSAH.
Tefft J.,  J. Staatz,  J. Dioné, and V. Kelly. 1998b. Food Security and Agricultural Subsectors in
West Africa. Future Prospects and Key Issues Four Years after the Devaluation of the
CFA Franc. Cotton Subsector. Policy Synthesis.  CILSS/INSAH.
World Bank.  Knowledge, Networks, Information and Technology Department.  1999.  African
Development Indicators 1998/99. Washington, D.C. : World Bank.
World Bank. 1999.  The World Bank Atlas 1999.  Washington, D.C. : World Bank.
Yade M., B. Kanté, and J. Staatz. 1998. Food Security and Agricultural Subsectors in West
Africa. Future Prospects and Key Issues Four Years after the Devaluation of the CFA
Franc. Beef Subsector.   Policy Synthesis.  Bamako: CILSS/INSAH.
Yade M., and B. Kanté 1998.  “Impact de la dévaluation du Franc CFA sur la promotion des
échanges du  bétail et de la viande en Afrique de l’Ouest - Résultats préliminaires.” 
Bamako: CILSS/INSAH.  March.28
Table A1: Evolution of GNP per Capita in U.S. Dollars, Calculated Using the World Bank
Atlas Method
Source: World Bank, Africa Development Indicators, 1998/99.29





Ghana         .8857*       .2000
Guinea        .8857*       .6000        .8286*
Mali            .9429**     .3143        .9429**    .9429**
Niger         -.3143        -.8286*     -.4286       -.5429        -.3714
Nigeria       .8407*       .4638        .5218        .8117*        .7247        -.2609
Mauritania  .6571         .4286        .3143        .7143         .6000        -.0857       .9276**
Senegal     -.4857         .2571       -.7714      -.3714        -.6000         .0286        .0290       .2000
                  Burkina  Côte d’Ivoire   Ghana    Guinea        Mali          Niger    Nigeria   Mauritania
B/ Millet/Maize/Sorghum/Fonio
 
Côte d’Ivoire    -.7714
Ghana           -.3714         .2571
Guinea          -.7143        .8286*       .3143
Mali               .7143         -.8286*      -.3143     -.4286
Mauritanie     .2000        -.7714        .0286       -.6000       .5429
Niger             .4286         -.3143         .0857       .0857       .7143      .0857
Nigeria         -.6571        .7714         .2000       .9429**   -.3143     -.5429        .2571
Senegal          .0857        -.3143         .7714      -.2571        .0286      .4286       -.0286   -.4286
                Burkina   Côte d’Ivoire     Ghana      Guinea       Mali   Mauritania  Niger    Nigeria
C/All Cereals
 
 CI                     -.7714
GHANA            -.5429         .3143
GUINEA           -.7143         .6000      .7143
MALI                  .6000       -.2000      .0286      -.0286
MAURITAN      -.0286        .2571      .0857      -.2571     .2571
NIGER               .2571        -.1429      .3143       .2571     .8286*     .3143
NIGERIA           -.7143        .6000      .7143     1.0000** -.0286     -.2571       .2571
SENEGAL         .4857         -.6000     .1429      -.5429      .0857      .1429      -.0857    -.5429
                         Burkina  Côte d’Ivoire  Ghana  Guinea     Mali      Mauritania  Niger    Nigeria 
* - Signif. ￿.05     ** - Signif.￿ .01     (2-tailed)
Source: Authors calculations from DIAPER and FAO Data30
Table A3 : Correlation of Quarterly Retail Grain Prices
Before Devaluation (1992 to 1993)
Millet Sorghum Maize
Bamako-Dakar .5724** 0.0978      .7646**
Bamako-Niamey -0.0654     NA      NA    
Bamako-Ouagadougou 0.0814     0.0549      0.2662    
Dakar-Niamey .3995** NA      NA    
Dakar-Ouagadougou -0.0162     .4942** 0.3306   
Ouagadougou-Niamey -2281     NA     NA   
After Devaluation (1994 to 1997)
Millet Sorghum Maize
Bamako-Dakar .7056** .8270** .8990**
Bamako-Niamey .6526** NA      NA    
Bamako-Ouagadougou .9245** .8606** .8649**
Dakar-Niamey .3913** NA      NA    
Dakar-Ouagadougou .7098** .8258** .8729**
Ouagadougou-Niamey .6417** NA      NA    
* - Signif. ￿.05     ** - Signif, ￿.01     (1-tailed)
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Figure A1.  Evolution of the Differential between Wholesale Prices for Cereals in Bamako
and Retail Prices for Cereals in Dakar, Compared with the Cost of Transporting the















Source:  Authors’ calculations from Data of Market Information Systems in Mali and Senegal.33
Table A4.   Millet, Maize and Sorghum Exports of CILSS Countries
Burkina Faso Mali Niger Chad Total CILSS
1987/88 0 0 0 0 0
1988/89 0 5000 400 0 5400
1989/90 1000 20000 0 2830 23830
1990/91 0 0 0 0 0
1991/92 2860 10790 0 0 13650
1992/93 0 9020 0 0 9020
1993/94 0 2490 0 0 2490
1994/95 0 66000 0 0 66000
1995/96 0 9600 0 0 9600
1996/97 0 18500 0 0 18500
1997/98 0 30900 0 0 30900
1998/99
(1) 0 25000 0 0 25000
Mean 1987/88-





164.21 92.79 223.61 223.61 96.24
Mean 1994/95-




1998/99 in % - 64.47 - - 64.47
Source : DIAPER Cereal Balance Sheets for CILSS Countries
(1) Preliminary data34
Table A5.   Declared Export Intentions by Malian Traders, by Type of Cereals
Source: Direction des Affaires Economiques du Mali.
Table A6.   Declared Export Intentions for Millet and Sorghum by Malian Traders, by
Destination
Source: Direction des Affaires Economiques du Mali.